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Impermissible Ratemaking in Health-Insurance Reform:
Why the Reid Bill is Unconstitutional
By Richard A. Epstein

Right now, the Senate is anxiously considering HR-SA 3590, the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act—a.k.a. the Reid Bill—which builds on earlier
efforts in the Senate and House to reach a new consensus on health-care reform. 1
Many legislative uncertainties remain, but its key characteristics seem fixed in
stone, and they highlight the radical nature of this legislation.
Senator Orrin Hatch has long urged that the legislation is unconstitutional for
its overreaching on individual choice. This paper focuses on the constitutional
question in the ratemaking context, by comparison to analogous regulations in the
context of public-utility regulation.
One telling sign of the relevance of this analysis comes from the
Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”). In a recent release, it has treated the proposal
as if it nationalizes much of the private health insurance industry, most specifically
because it may well require that rebates to customers kick in whenever, in its
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H.R. 3962, The Affordable Health Care for American Act, passed the House
this past November 7, 2009. A second bill, S. 1796, the America’s Health Future Act
of 2009, was reported in the Senate from the Senate Finance Committee on October
19, 2009. A third variant, S. 1679, the Affordable Health Choices Act, was reported in
the Senate from the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee on
September 17, 2009.
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words, “medical loss ratios are less than 90 percent.”2 In plain English, the Reid Bill
assumes that health-care administration, which is always costly, can be done
cheaply even in the new legal environment, so cheaply in fact that these healthinsurance rebates kick in whenever insurers’ administrative expenses exceed 10
percent of their premium dollar. As the CBO has concluded, “this further expansion
of the federal government’s role in the health insurance market would make such
insurance an essentially governmental program . . . .”
In effect, the onerous obligations under the Reid Bill would convert private
health insurance companies into virtual public utilities. This action is not only a
source of real anxiety but also a decision of constitutional proportions, for it
systematically strips the regulated health-insurance issuers of their constitutional
entitlement to earn a reasonable rate of return on the massive amounts of capital
that they have already invested in building out their businesses.
In order to make out this argument, let me proceed as follows. In part I, I
shall give a general overview in order to place in context the system of health-care
regulation that shall be operated through the State Exchanges that would be formed
under the Reid Bill. In part II, I shall give a detailed analysis of some of the major
provisions of the Reid Bill. In part III, I shall give a brief analysis of the economic
assumptions that underlie the Reid Bill, and the way in which they are likely to lead
to extensive price fixing. In part IV, I shall flesh out the constitutional implications of
the above analysis. I shall then close with a brief conclusion, which recommends
that the Reid Bill be scrapped.
I. AN INSTITUTIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL OVERVIEW The concern that I wish to
address at the outset deals with the unprecedented level of systemic coercion that
the Reid Bill exerts on the various firms that supply health-insurance coverage in
2

Congressional Budget Office, “Treatment of Proposals to Regulate Medical
Loss Ratios,” December 14, 2009. “A Medical loss ratio, or MLR, is the proportion of
premium dollars that an insurer spends on health care: it is commonly calculated as
the amount of claims incurred plus changes in reserves as a fraction of premiums
earned.” Id.
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the small-group and individual health-insurance markets. Constitutional concerns
with these provisions arise even if one assumes that Congress has the power under
the Commerce Clause to pass comprehensive regulation of health care in this form.
Independent of any question about the scope of Congressional power, it is critical to
consider that the Fifth Amendment affords regulated health-insurance companies
protection against the taking of property without compensation and without due
process of law.
These overlapping guarantees bind both the federal government and the
state governments in all of their activities, whether undertaken jointly or
independently. These constitutional provisions have been subject to extensive
interpretation in the Supreme Court in ratemaking cases, which must be taken into
account in dealing with the legislation. The Supreme Court’s basic constitutional
requirement is that any firm in a regulated market be allowed to recover a riskadjusted competitive rate of return on its accumulated capital investment. See
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1988).
The Reid Bill emphatically fails this test by imposing sharp limitations on the
ability of health-insurance companies to raise fees or exclude coverage. Moreover,
the Reid Bill forces on these regulated firms onerous new obligations that they will
not be able to fund from their various revenue sources. The squeeze between the
constricted revenue sources allowable under the Reid Bill and the extensive new
legal obligations it imposes is likely to result in massive cash crunch that could drive
the firms that serve the individual and small-group health-insurance markets into
bankruptcy.
Although the Constitution requires that regulations permit regulated firms
to recover a risk-adjusted competitive rate of return, the Supreme Court has left it
up to federal regulators to decide which approach to rate regulation they wish to
take. On page 20, I discuss the two major tests that are used to determine whether
rates are confiscatory. In one instance, the risk of imprudent investments is left on
the firm, and in the other, it is imposed on the ratepayers. Here, the combined effect
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of all the provisions in HR-SA 6590 makes it unimportant to choose between these
two tests, because the blunt truth is that the Reid Bill flunks both tests.
To make this analysis more concrete, it is important to understand the
pervasive transformation that the Reid Bill, if passed, will work on both suppliers
and users of all health-insurance services. On the one hand, the Reid Bill depends on
a combination of huge general tax increases, which is coupled with special levies on
industries such as medical-device and pharmaceutical companies. These tax
revenues are then used to fund subsidies for large segments of the population in
order to allow them to purchase qualified health-care plans that are sold through a
set of State Exchanges that the Reid Bill creates. In order to prevent these subsidies
from flowing through to the various health-insurance issuers, the Reid Bill imposes
extensive obligations on any health-insurance issuer or health-plan provider that
wishes to participate within the system in order to keep them from capturing
subsidies meant for others. The effect of the subsidies is to increase the level of
health care that will be demanded in the United States. The effect of the regulations
is likely to be to impose huge costs on various health-insurance companies as they
struggle to meet the influx of demand when they are at the outer limit of their
capacity.
There are at this point enormous uncertainties about how this entire scheme
will play out. My view is that it will prove ruinous on all three fronts. The general
public tax increases will be so sharp that it is unlikely that they will generate
additional revenues. The subsidies will be so large that the demand for medical
services will be left largely unsatisfied, so two consequences are likely. First, an
increased queuing for various health care services is to be expected. Second, there
will be increased pressure to exclude large groups of people from the system, on the
lines of Massachusetts’s recent decision to cut from its system 31,000 legal
immigrant aliens (who pay taxes but do not vote).
Furthermore, on the supply side of the market, all health-insurance
companies will find themselves in an impossible dilemma. If they decide to offer
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their health-insurance plans outside the State Exchanges, they will be unable to
compete for the subsidized consumers who are only able to spend their tax dollars
within the framework of the State Exchanges. Their position will be worse because
they shall continue to be subject to all present mandates and regulations that have
an impact on their business. Insurers outside the Exchanges also face the likely
prospect that they will still be further taxed and regulated to help finance the
intolerable burdens that arise under the subsidized insurance supplied within the
State Exchange system.
Therefore, it is impossible in my view to look in isolation at the regulations of
the health plans and health-insurance issuers that operate under the State Exchange
system. This is not a case in which a lonesome competitor complains about a
subsidy that some private person gives to its competitor. This is a case in which the
party that provides the subsidy to health-insurance consumers for use within the
State Exchanges also has the power to regulate and tax the non-Exchange
competitors in whatever fashion it sees fit. These impositions are, of course, not
only applied at the federal level, for the full consideration of the regulatory burden
must also take into account any additional regulations and taxes that the states, with
explicit Congressional blessing, are allowed to impose on health-insurance plans
and insurance issuers that remain outside the State Exchange system.
This level of systemic coercion frames the debate about the constitutionality
of the Reid Bill. Those parties that do not wish to suffer the Bill’s regulations in
order to gain access to a subsidized consumer base are not free to compete in an
unregulated market. Direct federal and state government regulation remains a fixed
feature of their life. Government regulators at the state and federal levels have both
the power and the motive to hit non-Exchange health insurance issuers with a range
of taxes and regulations that could quickly make their economic position intolerable.
I reached this conclusion before I read the recent CBO report, which concluded that
the level of government regulation with the new proposal to require rebates when
the Medical Loss Ratio was under 90 percent left so little flexibility for private
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carriers that they should no longer be treated as nongovernmental entities. It is
worthwhile to quote the CBO’s words here:
Certain policies governing MLRs, particularly those requiring health plans
whose MLR falls below a minimum level to rebate the difference to enrollees,
can be a powerful regulatory tool. Insurers operating at MLRs below such a
minimum would have a limited number of possible responses. They could
change the way they provide health insurance, perhaps by reducing their
profits or cutting back on efforts to restrain benefit costs through care
management. They could choose pay the rebates, but if they raised premiums
to cover the added costs they would simply have to rebate that increment to
premiums later. Alternatively, they could exit the market entirely. Such
responses would reduce the types, range of prices, and number of privatesector sellers of health insurance. . . .
The CBO of course is not charged with drawing the constitutional
implications from its findings. But its report reaffirms what should be evident from
the Reid Bill itself, namely, that health-insurance issuers subject to the rebate
provisions are practically forced to operate within the State Exchange system where
the guaranteed-issue and renewal provisions coupled with the onerous
requirements of the essential-benefit plans put them in this impossible position:
They cannot earn a reasonable return on their investment, which is required under
the Takings and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
Let me now offer a more detailed analysis of how this looming tragedy is likely to
play itself out.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF H.R.-S.A. 3590—THE REID BILL The most obvious feature of
the Reid Bill is the incredible level of coercion it imposes on the private companies
that supply health-insurance coverage, levied in a coordinated one-two attack. On
the one hand, the Reid Bill imposes major requirements on how they do business.
On the other, it imposes powerful financial limitations on the revenues that such
firms can collect for the provision of their services. Yet the Reid Bill contains no
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mechanism that guarantees that the revenues in question will be sufficient to cover
the new obligations that it imposes. Instead, the Reid Bill relies on extensive but
standardless delegation to the Secretary of Health and Human Services to fill in the
gaps of the legislation. (The Reid Bill does not create, as does section 241 of H.R.
3962, a new Health Choices Administration with its own commissioner.)
The range of matters that are subject to administrative control under the
Reid Bill transforms a large sector of the insurance industry. The traditional law of
insurance gave the insurer the complete power to determine whether to accept or
reject a given risk, or to determine the premiums to be charged to an insured, the
policy limits, and the terms and conditions on which the policy was issued. The
duties to disclose were extensive but these were correctly imposed on the insured
who alone possessed the relevant knowledge about the nature and scope of the risk.
In this traditional environment, regulation of insurance companies was
directed to two different issues. The first was a general form of consumer
protection, which requires a full disclosure of the terms of policies, which of course
does not negate the critical duties to disclose information about material risks
imposed on insured parties. The second went to the issue of solvency, in order to
counter the real risk that the insurance carrier that had accepted a premium today
might not be around to pay off the health care bills that it had promised to pay
tomorrow. Competitive forces were generally used to determine premiums. The
various efforts to impose mandatory price controls and coverage on insurance
contracts in both the individual and small-group markets have typically driven up
the cost of business and have resulted, for example, in a reduction of the number of
individual employees who are covered by voluntary plans.
What is most striking about the combined effect of the various provisions in
the Reid bill is its cavalier disregard for the long-term stability of all segments of the
private health-insurance market, which are likely to be caught in a pincer between
the heavy mandates for coverage on the one side and their inability to exercise any
underwriting control over their book of business on the other. The Reid Bill does not
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achieve this objective by imposing direct restraints. Instead, its preferred method of
social control lies in the power of the Secretary to designate any health plan of a
given insurance company as a “qualified health plan” (“QHP”), as defined in section
1301, which allows the health-insurance company to serve customers who are
eligible for financial assistance under this bill. The size of these various benefits is
sufficiently large that no company that fails to become a QHP issuer is likely to
survive in an insurance market in which coverage is offered on the Exchange, as few
people will prefer to purchase a full-price plan to a heavily subsidized one. The
restrictions imposed on QHPs, however, are so onerous that all health insurance
companies are in effect caught in an impossible bind. The only way to reach
subsidized customers is to submit to ruinous financial regulation. The system,
therefore, operates in effect as a direct set of controls on virtually all companies that
wish to remain in the marketplace.
Let me set out some of the key provisions that are likely to have negative
impact on firms, which are added to the Public Health Service Act by section 1201 of
the Reid Bill. Section 2704 provides: “[a] group health plan and a health insurance
issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage may not impose any
preexisting condition exclusion to such plan or coverage.” Unlike the earlier House
and Senate Finance Committee bills, there appear to be no exceptions to this
particular rule. Yet section 2705 makes it clear that the “health status, medical
condition, claims experience, receipt of health care, medical history, genetic
information, evidence of insurability, disability, or source of injury (including
conditions arising out of acts of domestic violence) or any other health statusrelated factor determined appropriate by the Secretary” cannot be taken into
account in setting rules concerning enrollment eligibility.
In addition, section 2702 provides that every health insurance issuer in the
individual or group market must accept all applicants. Section 2703 imposes the
similar requirements on health-insurance issuers to renew or continue in force all
individual and group plans. These sections create the risk that some firms will be
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inundated with applications that they will be unable to serve. Unfortunately, the
mechanisms that the Reid Bill relies on for dealing with the capacity questions are
unequal to the challenge of regulation in any fast-moving and complex market.
The technical amendments found in section 1562 of the Reid Bill would make
applicable to all issuers in the group and individual health-insurance markets
certain provisions in section 2711 of the current Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg-11, which are currently applicable only to issuers in the small-group healthinsurance market. These provisions are codified at the end of new section 2702.
To begin with, the provision, as amended by the Reid Bill, would require
issuers in the group and individual health-insurance market to accept every
employer and eligible individual who applies for coverage, unless such an issuer
could demonstrate to the applicable state authority that it lacks the financial
capacity to underwrite additional coverage. No firm has the capacity to underwrite
all the business that comes its way. At some point, its marginal cost of supplying
additional coverage becomes prohibitively high. It is relatively easy for any healthinsurance issuer to determine that point for itself. It is far more difficult for it to
have to incur the time and expense to demonstrate that point to some applicable
state authority, which will then be given the power to determine, without bearing
financial responsibility of its mistakes, just how much business the health-insurance
issuer must underwrite, and which individuals should be eligible for that coverage.
The amended provision also requires the health-insurance issuer to further
show that its decisions to deny coverage are not based on the differential costs of
supplying that coverage to various individuals and groups under new section 2702
of the Public Health Service Act. And once it makes those determinations, it must
remain out of the market for 180 days unless it gets state administrative approval.
When market conditions change, or some individuals or groups opt out of coverage,
yet another hearing is required to reenter into the market. There is no assurance
that these applicable state authorities have either the resources or capacities to
determine these multiple questions for huge numbers of health-insurance issuers
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within the short period necessary to allow them to participate effectively in the
health insurance market, including in the Exchange. There does not appear to be any
federal funding to help out the states in the discharge of these responsibilities.
The overall level of federal control is heightened by the requirement that all
health-insurance issuers in the individual or small-group market provide an
essential benefits package that includes a wide range of “ambulatory patient
services, emergency services, hospitalization, maternity and newborn care, mental
health and substance abuse disorder services, including behavioral health
treatment, prescription drugs, rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices,
laboratory services, preventive and wellness services and chronic disease
management, pediatric services, including oral and vision care.” Section 2707. These
essential benefits are subject to explicit minimum requirements that the Secretary
“shall ensure that such essential health benefits reflect an appropriate balance
among” the required services set out in section 1302(b)(1), not discriminate in any
way “against individuals because of their age, disability, or expected length of life,”
and cover the full needs of “diverse segments of the population, including women,
children, persons with disabilities and other groups.” No health-insurance issuer
that participates in this market will be able to skimp on coverage.
In addition, the cost of compliance is heightened by the requirements of
section 2711, which covers all group health plans and health-insurance issuers and
prohibits the use of “lifetime limits on the dollar value of benefits for any participant
or beneficiary” (except for certain exempt plans that are not otherwise regulated
under state or federal law) and “unreasonable” annual limits on the value of benefits
for any participant or beneficiary. At the same time that these coverages are
guaranteed, the Reid Bill limits the amount of cost-sharing that can be required of
plan participants and the size of the deductibles ($2,000 for an individual and
$4,000 for a family in the small-group market). Such is the command of section
2707(b), making section 1302(c)(2) applicable to health insurance issuers in the
individual and small-group markets. Finally, termination of enrollees is often
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difficult under section 2712, which allows for the rescission of coverage only with
respect to any individual enrollee “who has performed an act or practice that
constitutes fraud or makes an intentional misrepresentation of material fact as
prohibited by the terms of the plan or coverage.”
The combined impact of these interconnected provisions is clear: there is no
feasible way that an insurance carrier can respond to the increased costs of
servicing of its book of business either by declining coverage or by reducing
services. With all escape hatches closed, the critical question is whether the healthinsurance issuer is in a position to raise rates in order to offset the risks in question.
On this question, section 2794 introduces a complex system of de facto price
controls that depends on the close cooperation of state and federal officials. The
initial process that goes into effect in 2010 requires the Secretary and the states to
develop a plan to look for “unreasonable increases” in charges for insurance
coverage.

At this point, all health-insurance issuers must submit to the state

insurance commission authority “a justification for an unreasonable premium
increase prior to the implementation of the increase.” (It is not stated as to how one
justifies increases that are, by definition, unreasonable.) Thereafter, once the
information has been submitted and evaluated, it appears that the state insurance
commissioner shall make appropriate recommendations “to the State Exchange
about whether particular health insurance issuers should be excluded from
participation in the Exchange based on a pattern or practice of excessive or
unjustified premium increases.” In effect, it appears that the State Exchanges can
exclude health-insurance issuers from offering their plans through the Exchanges, at
which point the subsidies to insurers will be lost.
As of 2014, the Secretary is put in a position to “monitor premium increases
of health insurance offered through an Exchange and outside of an Exchange.”
Section 2794(b)(2)(A). Of equal importance, the combined effect of section
2794(b)(2)(B) and section 1312(f)(2)(B) would seem to permit the states to
influence the premiums charged in the large-group market, even when no large-
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group coverage is offered through the State Exchange. And the states are put in the
position under the Reid Bill to deny Exchange access to those small-group and
individual plans that they determine have excessive rates. That power to exclude
from the Exchange remains a death knell for all plans in health-insurance markets in
which coverage is offered through the Exchange, so that the power to exclude again
converts itself into a de facto power to set maximum rates.
In addition, after 2014, it is at least possible that the power of the Secretary
to “monitor” could be read as a way to introduce price controls through the back
door. The natural reading of the section seems not to support that view, but
administrative officials often receive deference in their statutory interpretations
under Chevron, Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). More
specifically, the primary meaning of “monitor” is to “observe” or to “keep an eye on.”
But a secondary meaning is to supervise, which in this context might be read to give
the Secretary those more expansive powers.
The level of regulation over prices is not confined to these provisions. As
currently configured, the Reid Bill contains global caps on profits that operate on a
heads-I-win-tails-you-lose principle. Thus, section 2718(a) of the Public Health
Service Act, as added by the Reid Bill, imposes on “[a] health insurance issuer
offering group or individual health insurance coverage” reporting obligations on the
amount of premium dollars that are spent on “clinical services,” activities to
“improve health care,” and all other “non-claim costs.” Up to the end of 2013 (unless
extended), if this information reveals that the non-claim charges exceed 20 percent
of total costs in the group market, or 25 percent in the individual market, the Reid
Bill provides that, in the first instance, there “shall” be an annual rebate in the
amount of the excess over that level, section 2718(b)(1)(A) & (B). Section
2718(b)(1)(A) & (B) also provide that the individual states may order a reduction in
the 20 or 25 percent non-claim figures, so that the annual rebate kicks in at a lower
percentage.
In making that determination, under section 2718(b)(2), the states “shall seek
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to ensure adequate participation by health insurance issuers, competition in the
health insurance market in the State, and value for consumers so that premiums are
used for clinical services and quality improvements.” The amount of any stateadjusted rebate under section 2718(b)(1)(B) with respect to coverage in the
individual health insurance market can be adjusted only if the Secretary determines
that such rebates will “destabilize” the market. It is difficult to understand how
these inconsistent commands can be simultaneously achieved. “Adequate
participation” suggests that rates must be kept high enough to keep firms in the
market, while “value for consumers” pushes strongly in the opposite direction. In
the middle, “competition in the industry” is effectively gutted by the extensive
system of regulation that prevents firms from gaining extra profits from valuable
new innovations in health-care management or delivery systems.
The most insidious feature of this provision, however, lies in its
unconstitutional insistence on a global limitation on the profits obtained by any firm
that runs this regulatory gauntlet. The first point here is that no firm would be able
to show that its non-claim expenses do not exceed the maximum statutory
allowances. Given the high level of administrative costs that the Reid Bill imposes,
this is, to say the least, a strong possibility. It could easily be that the healthinsurance companies will find themselves in the unenviable position of having to
issue rebates at a time when they are operating at a loss. In addition, neither bill
takes into account the strong likelihood that overall costs will vary from year to
year. These statutory provisions are strictly one-way ratchets, such that the gains, if
any, in one year will be taxed away even if there were losses in previous years, or
even if losses are expected in future years. The lack of any averaging provision,
therefore, has the unhappy effect of placing a hard cap on earnings that is unrelated
to the overall risk of the venture.
There is yet another feature that requires some brief notice, for it goes to the
stability of preexisting plans. One of the ways that the legislation allows for
“acceptable” coverage to be obtained is by enrollment in a “grandfathered” health-
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insurance coverage plan. That sanctuary is far narrower than is commonly
supposed. Under section 1251 of the Reid bill, the only new enrollees that allow the
plan to keep its protected status relative to the State Exchanges are those that admit
new dependents of an employee or new employees. The admission of any other
person into the plan, such as retirees, will eliminate the preferred grandfathered
status under section 1401 of the Reid bill, which adds section 36B to the Internal
Revenue Code; section §36B(1)(b)(3)(c)(iii) determines the eligibility of plan
enrollees for various refundable tax credits or other premium assistance.
Section 1251 is, however, silent with respect to other possible features. The
definition of “grandfathered Health Insurance Coverage” in section 202 of the House
Bill made it crystal clear that this grandfather status would be lost when an existing
plan added or removed a benefit, or increased the premium for one group of
employees unless the same proportionate increases were imposed for all plan
participants. The Reid Bill is silent about the effect of these changes, which ordinary
plans necessarily make dozens of time each year. The question, therefore, remains
unanswered as to whether most grandfathered plans will be able to maintain their
preferred status, or whether they will lose that preferred status and be required to
meet all the substantive and procedural requirements necessary for new plans to
participate in the State Exchanges. Questions of this magnitude should not be left to
administrative discretion, but should be resolved in the Reid Bill itself.
III. FROM COMPETITION TO PRICE CONTROLS: THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS Whether or
not the Secretary is able to claim more extensive powers, it appears that the
complex price-control mechanism implicit in the Reid Bill operates on the
indefensible economic assumption that price controls are needed to wring
inefficiencies out of the operation of health-insurance issuers. Yet economic theory
unambiguously leads to the opposite conclusion. To take only the extreme cases, the
logic behind pure competition is that it leads to efficient outcomes because the
ability of customers to go elsewhere leads firms to reduce the costs required to meet
any specified level of service. In general, a competitive market is regarded as socially
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optimal because there is no movement in price, quality, or quantity that could make
one party better off without making another party worse off. Any assumption that
price controls, however implemented, offer some hidden road to the efficient
allocation of resources has been repeatedly exploded. One need only think of the
systematic cut back in services that is the hallmark of rent-controlled apartments to
understand this basic economic principle.
The logic of competition is clear. In competitive markets, the firm is always
engaged in a delicate balancing act whereby it must ask whether the additional
services that it could supply will generate revenues equal to, or greater than, its cost
of providing those services. The pressure of competition could never force a firm to
offer its products or services for sale at a loss. At the same time, the ability of
customers to go elsewhere will drive prices down to the marginal cost for the
provision of those products or services. Even the existence of monopoly power does
not allow any firm to make any money if it is forced by regulation to provide goods
and services below their costs. The existence of monopoly power only speaks to the
possibility of a firm raising its prices above marginal costs, for which rate regulation
may be an appropriate response, although always difficult to implement. But there
are clear caveats here that need to be observed first.
First, to justify rate regulation, there needs be some evidence of the existence
of monopoly, which is not likely in health-insurance markets in which multiple
parties are already in competition with each other. To be sure, that condition is not
uniform, in part because of the state restrictions on entry that are allowed under the
1945 McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015. But the existence of this entry
barrier does not require any form of rate-of-return regulation. It is a simple matter
to repeal McCarran-Ferguson to the extent that it authorizes state barriers to out-ofstate competition. That one legislative fix should reduce prices and expand access,
but not cost the federal government a dime.
Second, the rate regulation imposed by the federal government cannot be
allowed to become confiscatory by denying the firm the ability to recover an
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appropriate return on its capital. There is nothing that a system of price controls can
do to lower costs. In fact, price controls generally increase the costs of production to
firms by forcing them to meet heavy compliance costs. Under the Reid Bill, the costs
of providing service will necessarily increase because of the heavy compliance costs
imposed on health-insurance issuers, the uncertainty of their business position, and
their inability to select or decline customers or to set premiums in accordance with
known risks of various individuals or groups. There is no reason whatsoever to
think that any firm operating in this heavily controlled environment could eliminate
inefficiencies from its current operation to offset these losses. To give an analogy,
one of the major problems of rent-control and rent-stabilization systems is that once
landlords are revenue constrained, they cut services to save costs. They were
already doing their best before the regulation, which offers no magic bullet. The
logic same holds here. Services will be cut or delayed, in either visible or covert
fashion, just as the recent CBO report indicates. As far as I know, there has never
been a price-control system that can improve quality of output, and there never will
be.
Third, it is wholly unclear as to how private firms will be asked to price their
services under these new mandates dealing with guaranteed service and preexisting
conditions. One possibility, which seems inconsistent with Section 2794, is to allow
for competitive pricing without allowing the state to set the prices which are
required. But given the requirements under the Reid Bill, that position will not lead
to an offer to supply health insurance at a price that is lower than the blended cost
incurred for serving all potential customers. Those numbers could easily make the
insurance unaffordable for all but the most sick people. As healthier individuals
either stay out of, or abandon, the health-insurance market because of high
premiums, the blended rate will have to increase. Quite simply, the risks of adverse
selection by insureds are enormous: those individuals whose health prognosis
improves could leave the system, while those whose condition has worsened will
continue to demand coverage at the same rates as before.
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Fourth, persons who choose to stay out of health-plan coverage when healthy
(even by paying some tax) will migrate to the plans quickly once their own health
condition deteriorates. They would have complete and accurate knowledge of their
own condition that they would not need to disclose to the insurer, which is in effect
under a statutory duty to enter into a losing contract. The scope of the potential
liabilities is only increased by the huge number of individuals to whom this option is
made freely available. Wholly without any other consideration, the key
requirements prohibiting the use of pre-existing condition exclusion and requiring
guaranteed issue and renewal could easily impair the success of health insurance
issuers. Ironically, the programs that have the best coverage are the ones that are
most at risk, as there is nothing in either the Senate or House bill that appears to
alter the rates to account for the differential level of services offered. Other things
being equal, the dominant response under this type of mandate would be to reduce
the level of coverage across the board, thereby decreasing the options available to
many plan recipients. But even this option is blocked by the statutory requirements
for “essential health benefits,” with their mandatory minimums. On this score, the
degrees of freedom to vary rates that the Reid Bill allows health-insurance issuers in
the individual and small-group markets relate to “only” four factors, whether or not
the coverage is offered through the Exchange. Section 2701(a)(1), as added by
section 1201. In addition, these provisions apply with equal force to all healthinsurance issuers in the large-group market if the state allows any insurer to sell
large-group health insurance coverage through its Exchange.
What is noteworthy about these rate-setting provisions is that they do not
allow the health-care-insurance issuers the ability to accurately price their products.
The first factor stipulates that coverage for individuals may differ from that offered
to families. The second calls for states to establish one or more rating areas within
their respective states, subject to review by the Secretary if its areas are found to be
“not adequate,” under criteria that are nowhere specified in the bill. The choice of
these areas—are cities and suburbs in the same or different areas, for example—
could be critical for individual plans because the total premium is likely to be
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sensitive to the areas that are chosen. A health insurance carrier that has an
expensive book of business will not be able to adjust the rates accordingly once the
geographical boundaries are determined. That nonindividualized treatment could
easily create substantial losses for some firms and competitive advantages for
others. Finally, some variation is allowed for age up to a 3–to-1 ratio, and for
tobacco use up to a 1.5-to-1 ratio. Both these numbers are smaller than the actuarial
difference among these groups, so that this provision also requires cross subsidies
among plan participants under the guise of “prohibiting discriminatory premium
rates,” set out in section 2701(a).
At this point, the only possible response of companies is to raise prices to
levels that could easily prove economically and practicably unacceptable. Yet once
that is done, the prohibitions against “unreasonable” premium increases of section
2794 kick in to make it highly likely that the offending heath insurance issuer will be
thrown off the Exchange. But what other alternative is possible? Piling one mandate
on top of the other places powerful pressures to impose price controls on the health
insurance issuers. After all, the requirement for guaranteed renewal will not satisfy
the purposes of universal coverage with the State Exchanges if it is only offered at a
price that is beyond the reach of the individuals whom it is supposed to benefit. In
the end, therefore, I think that the implementation of the Reid Bill will lead key
government officials to impose direct and comprehensive price controls.
This point requires some elaboration. Every scheme that denies a firm the
ability to refuse to deal with potential customers has to have either a
nondiscrimination rule or a price-restriction rule or both. Thus, standard public
utilities have to take all comers. In some instances, they do so on a first-come, firstserved basis, as was the case typically when railroads were so regulated. Or these
utilities need to articulate some rule that requires a cut back in services offered to
earlier customers to make way for later ones, as was typically the case with publicutility hook-ups for gas and electricity. But those provisions will not work in an
environment that imposes specific duties, for customer access could easily be
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denied by what some government administrator deems to be systematically high
prices. The only way to make sure that these regulated plans provide access is
through some system of oversight on the rates that can be charged.
At this point, the Reid Bill exacerbates the major difficulties of government
regulation. The voluntary market under competition will never price goods and
services below their cost to the firm. As these costs go up, the health-insurance
markets will shrink, for it is quite likely that this mega-mandate will provide many
people with services that they do not want and cannot afford. The only two options
then are to take some benefits out from the mandate, or to impose price controls at
either the state or federal level. Clearly the latter is more likely to be chosen, but
there is nothing in either regulatory scheme to rule out the risk that the prices
charged will not cover the full costs of providing the benefits. Once again, the risk of
price controls is close at hand, even without any explicit authorization on the point.
The situation is still made worse because the federal standards are best
understood as creating floors and not ceilings. Indeed, section 1311(d)(3)(B) of the
Reid Bill coordinates federal and state programs by providing that state benefit
mandates continue to apply to Health Insurance Exchange participating plans so
long the state agrees to reimburse the federal government for any increase in
premium credits that is attributable to the premium increase arising from the
mandate. These additional demands could prove to be extremely costly to
companies that seek to acquire nationwide coverage for their employees in the face
of specialized mandates that often vary in their economic impact across state lines.

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS This detailed analysis of the Reid Bill helps
to set up the appropriate constitutional analysis. The applicable standards for
constitutional review have usually been developed in connection with rate-making
procedures in natural monopolies. Within this context, the social objective is to
limit the monopoly returns to public utilities, which do not face the risk of
competition from new entrants, because they operate in a market in which the

19

declining marginal cost of the initial entrant prevents a new entrant from gaining a
toehold. In such a situation, one permissible legislative response is to impose some
form of regulation that brings that established player back to a competitive rate of
return. I shall pass by all the difficulties in implementing such a program. It is
important to note, however, that it is never a satisfactory response for regulators to
drive the rates of return down to zero, for then no one would ever be prepared to
provide services.
Since it is necessary to compete for capital across the entire range of activities,
the constitutional protection afforded under both the Takings and the Due Process
Clauses provides that the rate of return cannot fall below that which the investors in
the firm could obtain in a competitive market. That calculation has to take into
account the level of risk associated with the business, which in general is low with
respect to public utilities that have at least de facto protection against new entry.
The hard question, therefore, is what kinds of systems of rate regulation will
pass constitutional muster. Within the traditional ratemaking system, the first issue
concerns what goes into the rate base. One view is to allow the firm only to include
those investments that remain used and usable in the business, which means that
the firm has to take the risk of investments that go to waste. For taking this risk, it
receives a higher risk-adjusted rate of return. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466
(1899). The alternative is to permit the use of a broader rate base, and to allow
therefore a lower rate of return because the risk of poor investments falls on the
ratepayers. See Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
In other instances, it is possible to avoid the cumbrous ratemaking proceedings by
instituting a system of rate caps, which in effect tell a firm in an industry like
telecommunications that its rate increases will be capped because the increased
efficiencies in doing business mean that the unit costs of supplying services will
always be on the decline.
What is striking is how far the ratemaking system for health insurance is
from all the above. There is no natural monopoly in health insurance, and there is a
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powerful way to open up health-insurance markets by knocking down the state
barriers to entry that have been in effect since 1945 under the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. Once it is clear—and it is generally clear—that the health insurance industry is
competitive or could easily be made competitive, the entire rationale for
government ratemaking is undermined. The point of ratemaking was to require the
firm to accept competitive rates of returns in a market setting where it enjoyed
monopoly power. Here, the market is either competitive already, or easily can be
made so. In this environment, ratemaking no longer serves any useful function.
Contrary to the implicit assumption behind the Reid Bill, ratemaking cannot
induce further efficiencies once competitive forces have driven out all elements of
monopoly power. Yet all firms are trapped, for the only way in which they can
escape ever more onerous requirements and restrictions is to render themselves
ineligible to enroll new groups or individuals—whose health insurance, of course,
their tax dollars will continue to fund. In addition, right now the Reid Bill subjects
plans outside the Exchanges to certain other legal requirements, which could easily
be tightened down the road. The non-Exchange health insurance issuers are,
therefore, placed in an untenable position that exposes them to the multiple
strategies in the Reid bill that control rates and set the terms of service and that will
have three unacceptable consequences: (1) to reduce the rate of return of health
insurance companies below competitive levels, (2) to pile expensive administrative
mandates on them, and (3) to generate major uncertainties as to how the federal
obligations on such companies will pan out.
At this point, there is a near mathematical certainty that the scheme of
health-insurance market regulation contemplated by the Reid bill will reduce the
risk-adjusted rate of return below the level needed to keep these firms in the
individual and small-group health-insurance markets. I am not aware of a single
provision in the Reid Bill that looks to ensuring a minimum rate of return. And there
are countless provisions in the bill that impose new obligations to cover services
while eliminating the revenue sources to deal with them. It is just this combination
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of regulatory programs that leads the CBO to treat private health insurance issuers
as part of a federal program—as though they have been subject to de facto
nationalization.
This systemic regulation of both Exchange and non-Exchange carriers shows,
moreover, that those health-insurance issuers that participate in the Exchange are
shorn of all constitutional rights. The requirement that the states order rebates of
money spent on non-claim expenses is not constitutionally permissible unless and
until the Reid Bill makes some allowance for earning a reasonable rate of return.
That return, moreover, must take into account the extra riskiness that flows from
the grant of broad delegated authority to the Secretary.
In addition, the decision to order rebates in good years without adjustments
for the losses in bad years makes it impossible for a firm to earn a reasonable rate of
return. In utility rate regulation, it is not constitutionally permissible to impose an
annual rate cap just at the competitive level, while leaving the carrier obligated to
eat the losses in poor years. Section 2718 of the Reid bill goes even further than
such unconstitutional provisions in the utility context:3 it imposes a hard cap,
without any accurate accounting for administrative costs or any explicit recognition
of the constitutional right to earn a reasonable profit.
To make matters worse, these overall caps apply on top of all the restrictions
on the ability to decline coverage or vary rates that are involved in other provisions
of the Reid Bill. These provisions necessarily raise the administrative costs of
providing insurance. There are no upper bounds on what can be required by various

3

If we were to assume that the health insurance company gets, at most, a
competitive return in good years—an assumption more generous than what the
Reid Bill provides—it still gets less than a competitive return in poor years. The
situation becomes like a coin flip, in which the regulator wins with “heads” and the
regulated health-insurance company loses with “tails.” Over the long run, the firm is
necessarily deprived of a competitive rate of return except in the wildly improbable
scenario that the firm earns exactly the competitive rate of return in all years.

22

federal and state officials who are charged with oversight of individual and smallgroup plans in many instances, and all health-care plans in others. At this point, it is
only a matter of time before the cost obligations are so enormous that even
complete freedom in setting prices would not allow the firm to remain in business.
Nor will this problem be cured by the vast pattern of subsidies and taxes that
permeate the rest of the bill. Quite to the contrary, the subsidies may put greater
pressure on the capacity of health insurance companies to operate, given that these
firms have no capacity to choose which plans to provide to which customers.
Given these facts, it is impossible for the rate regulation of firms in the
competitive health insurance industry to recover the constitutionally permissible
rate of return. So long as competitive rates of return remain the constitutional
benchmark, rate regulation necessarily fails. The unregulated rates are already at
the competitive level. Any system that reduces revenues, raises costs, and increases
uncertainty cannot possibly meet the applicable constitutional standard.
To my mind, the only serious question about the legislation is whether a
facial challenge will be allowed to the Reid Bill when it does not contain explicit
price-control features. Such facial challenge are often denied in land-use cases, but
in rate-regulation cases the result has usually been otherwise. To wait until the
program has run its course is to consign a health-insurance company to the
substantial risk of bankruptcy just for trying to stay in business. It does not have the
option to hold off development until the legal uncertainties are resolved. Since
neither the United States nor the individual states will pony up the huge losses
sustained by the regulated firms, the challenges have to be allowed before the
statute is implemented and not afterwards. How this issue will play out in litigation
no one can say for sure. But it would be, in my view, irresponsible for the Senate to
pass any health reform legislation that does not address the serious constitutional
infirmities found in the Reid Bill.
CONCLUSION: This ill-conceived legislation has many provisions that regulate
different aspects of private health-insurance companies. Taken together, the
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combined force of these provisions raises serious constitutional questions. I think
that these provisions are so intertwined with the rest of the legislation that it is
difficult to see how the entire statute could survive if one of its components is
defective to its core. How courts will deal with these difficult issues is of course not
known, but rate-regulation cases normally attract a higher level of scrutiny than,
say, land-use decisions.
There is, moreover, no quick fix that will eliminate the Reid Bill’s major
constitutional defects. It would, of course, be a catastrophe if the Congress sought to
put this program into place before its constitutionality were tested. Most
ratemaking challenges are done on the strength of the record, and I see no reason
why a court would let a health-insurance company be driven into bankruptcy before
it could present its case that the mixture of regulations and subsidies makes it
impossible to earn a reasonable return on its capital. At the very least, therefore,
there are massive problems of delayed implementation that will plague any healthcare legislation from the date of its passage. I should add that the many broad
delegations to key administrative officials will themselves give rise to major delays
and additional challenges on statutory or constitutional grounds.
The health of the American people should not be held hostage to such unwise
legislation. The Senate should reject the Reid Bill because of the unsustainability of
the statutory scheme regulating health-insurance markets. But there is also little
doubt that its central arrangements are unconstitutional, and will face serious legal
challenge for years to come. Rather than embarking on a fundamentally flawed
course of action, sure to spark litigation, the Senate should start over with other
reforms that go in the opposite direction: simplify the system so that market forces
can increase both quality and access in ways that no system of government
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mandates can hope to do. Deregulation is a word that has been forgotten in the
current debate. It should be returned to center stage.4
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